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ABSTRACT
Machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks
(DNNs), are vulnerable to adversarial examples: malicious
inputs modified to yield erroneous model outputs, while ap-
pearing unmodified to human observers. Potential attacks
include having malicious content like malware identified as
legitimate or controlling vehicle behavior. Yet, all existing
adversarial example attacks require knowledge of either the
model internals or its training data. We introduce the first
practical demonstration of an attacker controlling a remotely
hosted DNN with no such knowledge. Indeed, the only capa-
bility of our black-box adversary is to observe labels given
by the DNN to chosen inputs. Our attack strategy consists
in training a local model to substitute for the target DNN,
using inputs synthetically generated by an adversary and
labeled by the target DNN. We use the local substitute to
craft adversarial examples, and find that they are misclas-
sified by the targeted DNN. To perform a real-world and
properly-blinded evaluation, we attack a DNN hosted by
MetaMind, an online deep learning API. We find that their
DNN misclassifies 84.24% of the adversarial examples crafted
with our substitute. We demonstrate the general applicabil-
ity of our strategy to many ML techniques by conducting the
same attack against models hosted by Amazon and Google,
using logistic regression substitutes. They yield adversarial
examples misclassified by Amazon and Google at rates of
96.19% and 88.94%. We also find that this black-box attack
strategy is capable of evading defense strategies previously
found to make adversarial example crafting harder.
1. INTRODUCTION
A classifier is a ML model that learns a mapping between
inputs and a set of classes. For instance, a malware detector
is a classifier taking executables as inputs and assigning them
to the benign or malware class. Efforts in the security [5, 2,
9, 18] and machine learning [14, 4] communities exposed the
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vulnerability of classifiers to integrity attacks. Such attacks
are often instantiated by adversarial examples: legitimate
inputs altered by adding small, often imperceptible, perturba-
tions to force a learned classifier to misclassify the resulting
adversarial inputs, while remaining correctly classified by a
human observer. To illustrate, consider the following images,
potentially consumed by an autonomous vehicle [13]:
To humans, these images appear to be the same: our bio-
logical classifiers (vision) identify each image as a stop sign.
The image on the left [13] is indeed an ordinary image of a
stop sign. We produced the image on the right by adding
a precise perturbation that forces a particular DNN to clas-
sify it as a yield sign, as described in Section 5.2. Here, an
adversary could potentially use the altered image to cause
a car without failsafes to behave dangerously. This attack
would require modifying the image used internally by the car
through transformations of the physical traffic sign. Related
works showed the feasibility of such physical transformations
for a state-of-the-art vision classifier [6] and face recognition
model [11]. It is thus conceivable that physical adversarial
traffic signs could be generated by maliciously modifying the
sign itself, e.g., with stickers or paint.
In this paper, we introduce the first demonstration that
black-box attacks against DNN classifiers are practical for
real-world adversaries with no knowledge about the model.
We assume the adversary (a) has no information about the
structure or parameters of the DNN, and (b) does not have
access to any large training dataset. The adversary’s only
capability is to observe labels assigned by the DNN for chosen
inputs, in a manner analog to a cryptographic oracle.
Our novel attack strategy is to train a local substitute
DNN with a synthetic dataset: the inputs are synthetic and
generated by the adversary, while the outputs are labels
assigned by the target DNN and observed by the adversary.
Adversarial examples are crafted using the substitute param-
eters, which are known to us. They are not only misclassified
by the substitute but also by the target DNN, because both
models have similar decision boundaries.
This is a considerable departure from previous work, which
evaluated perturbations required to craft adversarial exam-
ples using either: (a) detailed knowledge of the DNN archi-
tecture and parameters [2, 4, 9, 14], or (b) an independently
collected training set to fit an auxiliary model [2, 4, 14]. This
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limited their applicability to strong adversaries capable of
gaining insider knowledge of the targeted ML model, or col-
lecting large labeled training sets. We release assumption (a)
by learning a substitute: it gives us the benefit of having full
access to the model and apply previous adversarial example
crafting methods. We release assumption (b) by replacing
the independently collected training set with a synthetic
dataset constructed by the adversary with synthetic inputs
and labeled by observing the target DNN’s output.
Our threat model thus corresponds to the real-world sce-
nario of users interacting with classifiers hosted remotely by
a third-party keeping the model internals secret. In fact,
we instantiate our attack against classifiers automatically
trained by MetaMind, Amazon, and Google. We are able
to access them only after training is completed. Thus, we
provide the first correctly blinded experiments concerning
adversarial examples as a security risk.
We show that our black-box attack is applicable to many
remote systems taking decisions based on ML, because it
combines three key properties: (a) the capabilities required
are limited to observing output class labels, (b) the number
of labels queried is limited, and (c) the approach applies
and scales to different ML classifier types (see Section 7),
in addition to state-of-the-art DNNs. In contrast, previous
work failed to simultaneously provide all of these three key
properties [4, 14, 12, 15, 18]. Our contributions are:
• We introduce in Section 4 an attack against black-box
DNN classifiers. It crafts adversarial examples without
knowledge of the classifier training data or model. To do
so, a synthetic dataset is constructed by the adversary
to train a substitute for the targeted DNN classifier.
• In Section 5, we instantiate the attack against a re-
mote DNN classifier hosted by MetaMind. The DNN
misclassifies 84.24% of the adversarial inputs crafted.
• The attack is calibrated in Section 6 to (a) reduce the
number of queries made to the target model and (b)
maximize misclassification of adversarial examples.
• We generalize the attack to other ML classifiers like lo-
gistic regression. In Section 7, we target models hosted
by Amazon and Google. They misclassify adversarial
examples at rates of 96.19% and 88.94%.
• Section 8 shows that our attack evades defenses pro-
posed in the literature because the substitute trained
by the adversary is unaffected by defenses deployed on
the targeted oracle model to reduce its vulnerability.
• In Appendix B, we provide an intuition of why adver-
sarial examples crafted with the substitute also mislead
target models by empirically observing that substitutes
have gradients correlated to the target’s.
Disclosure: We disclosed our attacks to MetaMind, Ama-
zon, and Google. Note that no damage was caused as we
demonstrated control of models created for our own account.
2. ABOUT DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS
We provide preliminaries of deep learning to enable under-
standing of our threat model and attack. We refer readers
interested to the more detailed presentation in [3].
A deep neural network (DNN), as illustrated in Figure 1,
is a ML technique that uses a hierarchical composition of n
parametric functions to model an input ~x. Each function fi
… … …
Input Layer Output Layer Hidden Layers
(e.g., convolutional, rectified linear, …)
{
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Figure 1: DNN Classifier: the model processes an image
of a handwritten digit and outputs the probility of it being
in one of the N = 10 classes for digits 0 to 9 (from [10]).
for i ∈ 1..n is modeled using a layer of neurons, which are
elementary computing units applying an activation function
to the previous layer’s weighted representation of the input to
generate a new representation. Each layer is parameterized
by a weight vector θi (we omit the vector notation) impacting
each neuron’s activation. Such weights hold the knowledge of
a DNN model F and are evaluated during its training phase,
as detailed below. Thus, a DNN defines and computes:
F (~x) = fn (θn, fn−1 (θn−1, ... f2 (θ2, f1 (θ1, ~x)))) (1)
The training phase of a DNN F learns values for its pa-
rameters θF = {θ1, ..., θn}. We focus on classification tasks,
where the goal is to assign inputs a label among a prede-
fined set of labels. The DNN is given a large set of known
input-output pairs (~x, ~y) and it adjusts weight parameters to
reduce a cost quantifying the prediction error between the
prediction F (~x) and the correct output ~y. The adjustment is
typically performed using techniques derived from the back-
propagation algorithm. Briefly, such techniques successively
propagate error gradients with respect to network parameters
from the network’s output layer to its input layer.
During the test phase, the DNN is deployed with a fixed
set of parameters θF to make predictions on inputs unseen
during training. We consider classifiers: the DNN produces
a probability vector F (~x) encoding its belief of input ~x being
in each of the classes (cf. Figure 1). The weight parameters
θF hold the model knowledge acquired by training. Ideally,
the model should generalize and make accurate predictions
for inputs outside of the domain explored during training.
However, attacks manipulating DNN inputs with adversarial
examples showed this is not the case in practice [4, 9, 14].
3. THREAT MODEL
A taxonomy of adversaries against DNN classifiers is found
in [9]. In our work, the adversary seeks to force a classifier
to misclassify inputs in any class different from their correct
class. To achieve this, we consider a weak adversary with
access to the DNN output only. The adversary has no knowl-
edge of the architectural choices made to design the DNN,
which include the number, type, and size of layers, nor of
the training data used to learn the DNN’s parameters. Such
attacks are referred to as black box, where adversaries need
not know internal details of a system to compromise it.
MNIST Dataset GTSRD Dataset
5 8
0 3
Figure 2: Adversarial samples (misclassified) in the bot-
tom row are created from the legitimate samples [7, 13] in the
top row. The DNN outputs are identified below the samples.
Targeted Model: We consider attackers targeting a multi-
class DNN classifier. It outputs probability vectors, where
each vector component encodes the DNN’s belief of the input
being part of one of the predefined classes. We consider the
ongoing example of a DNN classifying images, as shown in
Figure 1. Such DNNs can be used to classify handwritten
digits into classes associated with digits from 0 to 9, images
of objects in a fixed number of categories, or images of traffic
signs into classes identifying its type (STOP, yield, ...).
Adversarial Capabilities: The oracle O is the targeted
DNN. Its name refers to the only capability of the adversary:
accessing the label O˜(~x) for any input ~x by querying oracle
O. The output label O˜(~x) is the index of the class assigned
the largest probability by the DNN:
O˜(~x) = arg max
j∈0..N−1
Oj(~x) (2)
where Oj(~x) is the j-th component of the probability vector
O(~x) output by DNN O. Distinguishing between labels and
probabilities makes adversaries realistic (they more often
have access to labels than probabilities) but weaker: labels
encode less information about the model’s learned behavior.
Accessing labels O˜ produced by the DNN O is the
only capability assumed in our threat model. We do
not have access to the oracle internals or training data.
Adversarial Goal: We want to produce a minimally al-
tered version of any input ~x, named adversarial sample, and
denoted ~x∗, misclassified by oracle O: O˜( ~x∗) 6= O˜(~x). This
corresponds to an attack on the oracle’s output integrity. Ad-
versarial samples solve the following optimization problem:
~x∗ = ~x+ arg min{~z : O˜(~x+ ~z) 6= O˜(~x)} = ~x+ δ~x (3)
Examples of adversarial samples can be found in Figure 2.
The first row contains legitimate samples and the second cor-
responding adversarial samples that are misclassified. This
misclassification must be achieved by adding a minimal per-
turbation δ~x so as to evade human detection. Even with total
knowledge of the architecture used to train model O and its
parameters resulting from training, finding such a minimal
perturbation is not trivial, as properties of DNNs preclude
the optimization problem from being linear or convex. This
is exacerbated by our threat model: removing knowledge of
model O’s architecture and training data makes it harder to
find a perturbation such that O˜(~x+ δ~x) 6= O˜(~x) holds.
In Appendix C, we give a presentation of attacks conducted
in related threat models—with stronger assumptions.
4. BLACK-BOX ATTACK STRATEGY
We introduce our black-box attack. As stated in Section 3,
the adversary wants to craft inputs misclassified by the ML
model using the sole capability of accessing the label O˜(~x)
assigned by classifier for any chosen input ~x. The strategy is
to learn a substitute for the target model using a synthetic
dataset generated by the adversary and labeled by observing
the oracle output. Then, adversarial examples are crafted us-
ing this substitute. We expect the target DNN to misclassify
them due to transferability between architectures [14, 4]
To understand the difficulty of conducting the attack under
this threat model, recall Equation 3 formalizing the adver-
sarial goal of finding a minimal perturbation that forces the
targeted oracle to misclassify. A closed form solution cannot
be found when the target is a non-convex ML model: e.g., a
DNN. The basis for most adversarial attacks [4, 9, 14] is to
approximate its solution using gradient-based optimization
on functions defined by a DNN. Because evaluating these
functions and their gradients requires knowledge of the DNN
architecture and parameters, such an attack is not possible
under our black-box scenario. It was shown that adversaries
with access to an independently collected labeled training set
from the same population distribution than the oracle could
train a model with a different architecture and use it as a
substitute [14]: adversarial examples designed to manipulate
the substitute are often misclassified by the targeted model.
However, many modern machine learning systems require
large and expensive training sets for training. For instance,
we consider models trained with several tens of thousands of
labeled examples. This makes attacks based on this paradigm
unfeasible for adversaries without large labeled datasets.
In this paper, we show black-box attacks can be accom-
plished at a much lower cost, without labeling an independent
training set. In our approach, to enable the adversary to
train a substitute model without a real labeled dataset, we
use the target DNN as an oracle to construct a synthetic
dataset. The inputs are synthetically generated and the out-
puts are labels observed from the oracle. Using this synthetic
dataset, the attacker builds an approximation F of the model
O learned by the oracle. This substitute network F is then
used to craft adversarial samples misclassified by F Indeed,
with its full knowledge of the substitute DNN F parame-
ters, the adversary can use one of the previously described
attacks [4, 9] to craft adversarial samples misclassified by F .
As long as the transferability property holds between F and
O, adversarial samples crafted for F will also be misclassified
by O. This leads us to propose the following strategy:
1. Substitute Model Training: the attacker queries
the oracle with synthetic inputs selected by a Jacobian-
based heuristic to build a model F approximating the
oracle model O’s decision boundaries.
2. Adversarial Sample Crafting: the attacker uses
substitute network F to craft adversarial samples, which
are then misclassified by oracle O due to the transfer-
ability of adversarial samples.
4.1 Substitute Model Training
Training a substitute model F approximating oracle O is
challenging because we must: (1) select an architecture for
our substitute without knowledge of the targeted oracle’s
architecture, and (2) limit the number of queries made to the
oracle in order to ensure that the approach is tractable. Our
approach, illustrated in Figure 3, overcomes these challenges
mainly by introducing a synthetic data generation technique,
the Jacobian-based Dataset Augmentation. We emphasize
that this technique is not designed to maximize the substitute
DNN’s accuracy but rather ensure that it approximates the
oracle’s decision boundaries with few label queries.
Substitute Architecture: This factor is not the most
limiting as the adversary must at least have some partial
knowledge of the oracle input (e.g., images, text) and ex-
pected output (e.g., classification). The adversary can thus
use an architecture adapted to the input-output relation. For
instance, a convolutional neural network is suitable for image
classification. Furthermore, we show in Section 6 that the
type, number, and size of layers used in the substitute DNN
have relatively little impact on the success of the attack.
Adversaries can also consider performing an architecture ex-
ploration and train several substitute models before selecting
the one yielding the highest attack success.
Generating a Synthetic Dataset: To better understand
the need for synthetic data, note that we could potentially
make an infinite number of queries to obtain the oracle’s
output O(~x) for any input ~x belonging to the input domain.
This would provide us with a copy of the oracle. However,
this is simply not tractable: consider a DNN with M input
components, each taking discrete values among a set of K
possible values, the number of possible inputs to be queried
is KM . The intractability is even more apparent for inputs in
the continuous domain. Furthermore, making a large number
of queries renders the adversarial behavior easy to detect.
A natural alternative is to resort to randomly selecting
additional points to be queried. For instance, we tried using
Gaussian noise to select points on which to train substitutes.
However, the resulting models were not able to learn by
querying the oracle. This is likely due to noise not being
representative of the input distribution. To address this issue,
we thus introduce a heuristic efficiently exploring the input
domain and, as shown in Sections 5 and 6, drastically limits
the number of oracle queries. Furthermore, our technique
also ensures that the substitute DNN is an approximation of
the targeted DNN i.e. it learns similar decision boundaries.
The heuristic used to generate synthetic training inputs is
based on identifying directions in which the model’s output is
varying, around an initial set of training points. Such direc-
tions intuitively require more input-output pairs to capture
the output variations of the target DNN O. Therefore, to
get a substitute DNN accurately approximating the oracle’s
decision boundaries, the heuristic prioritizes these samples
when querying the oracle for labels. These directions are
identified with the substitute DNN’s Jacobian matrix JF ,
which is evaluated at several input points ~x (how these
points are chosen is described below). Precisely, the adver-
sary evaluates the sign of the Jacobian matrix dimension
corresponding to the label assigned to input ~x by the ora-
cle: sgn
(
JF (~x)[O˜(~x)]
)
. To obtain a new synthetic training
point, a term λ · sgn
(
JF (~x)[O˜(~x)]
)
is added to the original
point ~x. We name this technique Jacobian-based Dataset
Augmentation. We base our substitute training algorithm
on the idea of iteratively refining the model in directions
identified using the Jacobian.
Substitute DNN Training Algorithm: We now describe
Algorithm 1 - Substitute DNN Training: for oracle O˜,
a maximum number maxρ of substitute training epochs, a
substitute architecture F , and an initial training set S0.
Input: O˜, maxρ, S0, λ
1: Define architecture F
2: for ρ ∈ 0 .. maxρ − 1 do
3: // Label the substitute training set
4: D ←
{
(~x, O˜(~x)) : ~x ∈ Sρ
}
5: // Train F on D to evaluate parameters θF
6: θF ← train(F,D)
7: // Perform Jacobian-based dataset augmentation
8: Sρ+1 ← {~x+ λ · sgn(JF [O˜(~x)]) : ~x ∈ Sρ} ∪ Sρ
9: end for
10: return θF
the five-step training procedure outlined in Algorithm 1:
• Initial Collection (1): The adversary collects a very
small set S0 of inputs representative of the input do-
main. For instance, if the targeted oracle O classifies
handwritten digits, the adversary collects 10 images of
each digit 0 through 9. We show in Section 5 that this
set does not necessarily have to come from the distri-
bution from which the targeted oracle was trained.
• Architecture Selection (2): The adversary selects
an architecture to be trained as the substitute F . Again,
this can be done using high-level knowledge of the clas-
sification task performed by the oracle (e.g., convolu-
tional networks are appropriate for vision)
• Substitute Training: The adversary iteratively trains
more accurate substitute DNNs Fρ by repeating the
following for ρ ∈ 0..ρmax:
– Labeling (3): By querying for the labels O˜(~x)
output by oracle O, the adversary labels each
sample ~x ∈ Sρ in its initial substitute training set
Sρ.
– Training (4): The adversary trains the architec-
ture chosen at step (2) using substitute training
set Sρ in conjunction with classical training tech-
niques.
– Augmentation (5): The adversary applies our
augmentation technique on the initial substitute
training set Sρ to produce a larger substitute train-
ing set Sρ+1 with more synthetic training points.
This new training set better represents the model’s
decision boundaries. The adversary repeats steps
(3) and (4) with the augmented set Sρ+1.
Step (3) is repeated several times to increase the substitute
DNN’s accuracy and the similarity of its decision boundaries
with the oracle. We introduce the term substitute training
epoch, indexed with ρ, to refer to each iteration performed.
This leads to this formalization of the Jacobian-based Dataset
Augmentation performed at step (5) of our substitute training
algorithm to find more synthetic training points:
Sρ+1 = {~x+ λ · sgn(JF [O˜(~x)]) : ~x ∈ Sρ} ∪ Sρ (4)
where λ is a parameter of the augmentation: it defines the
size of the step taken in the sensitive direction identified by
the Jacobian matrix to augment the set Sρ into Sρ+1.
Oracle DNN O
Substitute DNN F 
Training
Substitute Dataset 
Labeling
Jacobian-based
Dataset AugmentationS⇢ F⇢
Substitute Training 
Dataset Collection
Substitute DNN 
Architecture Selection
1
2
3 4 5S0
F
S⇢ O˜(S⇢)
⇢ ⇢+ 1
S⇢+1 = {~x+  ⇢+1 · sgn(JF [O˜(~x)]) : ~x 2 S⇢} [ S⇢
Figure 3: Training of the substitute DNN F : the attacker (1) collects an initial substitute training set S0 and (2) selects
an architecture F . Using oracle O˜, the attacker (3) labels S0 and (4) trains substitute F . After (5) Jacobian-based dataset
augmentation, steps (3) through (5) are repeated for several substitute epochs ρ.
4.2 Adversarial Sample Crafting
Once the adversary trained a substitute DNN, it uses it to
craft adversarial samples. This is performed by implementing
two previously introduced approaches described in [4, 9].
We provide an overview of the two approaches, namely the
Goodfellow et al. algorithm and the Papernot et al. algorithm.
Both techniques share a similar intuition of evaluating the
model’s sensitivity to input modifications in order to select
a small perturbation achieving the misclassification goal1.
Goodfellow et al. algorithm: This algorithm is also
known as the fast gradient sign method [4]. Given a model
F with an associated cost function c(F, ~x, y), the adversary
crafts an adversarial sample ~x∗ = ~x+δ~x for a given legitimate
sample ~x by computing the following perturbation:
δ~x = ε sgn(∇~xc(F, ~x, y)) (5)
where perturbation sgn(∇~xc(F, ~x, y)) is the sign of the model’s
cost function 2 gradient. The cost gradient is computed with
respect to ~x using sample ~x and label y as inputs. The value
of the input variation parameter ε factoring the sign matrix
controls the perturbation’s amplitude. Increasing its value
increases the likelihood of ~x∗ being misclassified by model
F but on the contrary makes adversarial samples easier to
detect by humans. In Section 6, we evaluate the impact of
parameter ε on the successfulness of our attack.
Papernot et al. algorithm: This algorithm is suitable
for source-target misclassification attacks where adversaries
seek to take samples from any legitimate source class to any
chosen target class [9]. Misclassification attacks are a special
case of source-target misclassifications, where the target class
can be any class different from the legitimate source class.
Given model F , the adversary crafts an adversarial sample
~x∗ = ~x + δ~x for a given legitimate sample ~x by adding a
perturbation δ~x to a subset of the input components ~xi.
To choose input components forming perturbation δ~x, com-
ponents are sorted by decreasing adversarial saliency value.
The adversarial saliency value S(~x, t)[i] of component i for
an adversarial target class t is defined as:
S(~x, t)[i] =
{
0 if ∂Ft
∂~xi
(~x) < 0 or
∑
j 6=t
∂Fj
∂~xi
(~x) > 0
∂Ft
∂~xi
(~x)
∣∣∣∑j 6=t ∂Fj∂~xi (~x)∣∣∣ otherwise (6)
1Our attack can be implemented with other adversarial ex-
ample algorithms. We focus on these two in our evaluation.
2As described here, the method causes simple misclassifica-
tion. It has been extended to achieve chosen target classes.
where matrix JF =
[
∂Fj
∂~xi
]
ij
is the model’s Jacobian matrix.
Input components i are added to perturbation δ~x in order
of decreasing adversarial saliency value S(~x, t)[i] until the
resulting adversarial sample ~x∗ = ~x + δ~x is misclassified
by F . The perturbation introduced for each selected input
component can vary: greater perturbation reduce the number
of components perturbed to achieve misclassification.
Each algorithm has its benefits and drawbacks. The Good-
fellow algorithm is well suited for fast crafting of many ad-
versarial samples with relatively large perturbations thus
potentially easier to detect. The Papernot algorithm reduces
perturbations at the expense of a greater computing cost.
5. VALIDATION OF THE ATTACK
We validate our attack against remote and local classifiers.
We first apply it to target a DNN remotely provided by
MetaMind, through their API3 that allows a user to train
classifiers using deep learning. The API returns labels pro-
duced by the DNN for any given input but does not provide
access to the DNN. This corresponds to the oracle described
in our threat model. We show that:
• An adversary using our attack can reliably force the
DNN trained using MetaMind on MNIST [7] to mis-
classify 84.24% of adversarial examples crafted with a
perturbation not affecting human recognition.
• A second oracle trained locally with the German Traffic
Signs Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [13], can be
forced to misclassify more than 64.24% of altered inputs
without affecting human recognition.
5.1 Attack against the MetaMind Oracle
Description of the Oracle: We used the MNIST hand-
written digit dataset to train the DNN [7]. It comprises
60, 000 training and 10, 000 test images of handwritten digits.
The task associated with the dataset is to identify the digit
corresponding to each image. Each 28x28 grayscale sample
is encoded as a vector of pixel intensities in the interval [0, 1]
and obtained by reading the image pixel matrix row-wise.
We registered for an API key on MetaMind’s website,
which gave us access to three functionalities: dataset upload,
automated model training, and model prediction querying.
We uploaded the 50, 000 samples included in the MNIST
3The API can be accessed online at www.metamind.io
training set to MetaMind and then used the API to train
a classifier on the dataset. We emphasize that training is
automated: we have no access to the training algorithm,
model architecture, or model parameters. All we are given is
the accuracy of the resulting model, computed by MetaMind
using a validation set created by isolating 10% of the training
samples. Details can be found on MetaMind’s website.
Training took 36 hours to return a classifier with a 94.97%
accuracy. This performance cannot be improved as we cannot
access or modify the model’s specifications and training
algorithm. Once training is completed, we could access
the model predictions, for any input of our choice, through
the API. Predictions take the form of a class label. This
corresponds to the threat model described in Section 3.
Initial Substitute Training Sets: First, the adversary
collects an initial substitute training set. We describe two
such sets used to attack the MetaMind oracle:
• MNIST subset: This initial substitute training set is
made of 150 samples from the MNIST test set. They
differ from those used by the oracle for training as test
and training sets are distinct. We assume adversaries
can collect such a limited sample set under the threat
model described in Section 3 with minimal knowledge
of the oracle task: here, handwritten digit classification.
• Handcrafted set: To ensure our results do not stem from
similarities between the MNIST test and training sets,
we also consider a handcrafted initial substitute training
set. We handcrafted 100 samples by handwriting 10
digits for each class between 0 and 9 with a laptop
trackpad. We then adapted them to the MNIST format
of 28x28 grayscale pixels. Some are shown below.
Substitute DNN Training: The adversary uses the initial
substitute training sets and the oracle to train subsitute
DNNs. Our substitute architecture A, a standard for image
classification, is described in Table 13 (cf. appendix). The
substitute DNN is trained on our machine for 6 substitute
epochs. During each of these 6 epochs, the model is trained
for 10 epochs from scratch with a learning rate of 10−2 and
momentum of 0.9. Between substitute epochs, we perform
a Jacobian-based dataset augmentation with a step size of
λ = 0.1 to generate additional synthetic training data, which
we label using the MetaMind oracle.
The accuracy of the two substitute DNNs is reported in
Figure 4. It is computed with the MNIST test set (minus
the 150 samples used in the first initial substitute training
set). The adversary does not have access to this full test set:
we solely use it to analyze our results. The two substitute
DNNs respectively achieve a 81.20% and 67.00% accuracy on
the MNIST test set after 6 substitute training epochs. These
accuracies fall short of current state-of-the-art accuracies on
this task. However, the adversary has access to a limited
number of samples (in this case 6, 400 = 100 × 26 instead
of 50, 000 for state-of-the-art models). Furthermore, the
adversarial goal is to craft adversarial samples misclassified by
the oracle. Instead of learning a substitute DNN with optimal
accuracy, the adversary is interested in learning a substitute
capable of mimicking the oracle decision boundaries.
Substitute Initial Substitute Training Set from
Epoch MNIST test set Handcrafted digits
0 24.86% 18.70%
1 41.37% 19.89%
2 65.38% 29.79%
3 74.86% 36.87%
4 80.36% 40.64%
5 79.18% 56.95%
6 81.20% 67.00%
Figure 4: Substitute DNN Accuracies: each column
corresponds to an initial substitute training set: 150 MNIST
test samples, and handcrafted digits. Accuracy is reported
on the unused 9,850 MNIST test samples.
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Figure 5: Success Rate and Transferability of Adver-
sarial Samples for the MetaMind attacks: performed
using MNIST-based and handcrafted substitutes: each bar
corresponds to a different perturbation input variation.
Adversarial Sample Crafting: Using the substitute DNNs,
we then craft adversarial samples using Goodfellow’s algo-
rithm. We decided to use the 10, 000 samples from the
MNIST test set as our legitimate samples.4 We evaluate
sample crafting using two metrics: success rate and trans-
ferability. The success rate is the proportion of adversarial
samples misclassified by the substitute DNN. Our goal is
to verify whether these samples are also misclassified by
the oracle or not. Therefore, the transferability of adver-
sarial samples refers to the oracle misclassification rate of
adversarial samples crafted using the substitute DNN.
Figure 5 details both metrics for each substitute DNN and
for several values of the input variation ε (cf. Equation 5).
Transferability reaches 84.24% for the first substitute DNN
and 78.72% for the second, with input variations of ε = 0.3.
Our attack strategy is thus effectively able to severely damage
the output integrity of the MetaMind oracle. Using the
substitute training set handcrafted by the adversary limits
the transferability of adversarial samples when compared to
the substitute set extracted from MNIST data, for all input
variations except ε = 0.2. Yet, the transferability of both
substitutes is similar, corroborating that our attack can be
executed without access to any of the oracle’s training data.
To analyze the labels assigned by the MetaMind oracle, we
4Again, adversaries do not need access to the dataset and can
use any legitimate sample of their choice to craft adversarial
samples. We use it in order to show that expected inputs
can be misclassified on a large scale.
" = 0.05 " = 0.20
" = 0.25 " = 0.30
Figure 6: MetaMind Oracle Confusion Matrices for
different input variations ε. Cell (x, y) indicates the
share of digit y instances classified by the oracle as digit x.
plot confusion matrices for adversarial samples crafted using
the first substitute DNN with 4 values of ε. In Figure 6,
rates on the diagonal indicate the proportion of samples
correctly classified by the oracle for each of the 10 classes. Off-
diagonal values are the proportion of samples misclassified
in a wrong class. For instance, cell (8, 3) in the third matrix
indicates that 89% instances of a 3 are classified as a 8 by the
oracle when perturbed with an input variation of ε = 0.25.
Confusion matrices converge to most samples being classified
as 4s and 8s as ε increases. This could be due to DNNs more
easily classifying inputs in these classes [9].
5.2 Attacking an oracle for the GTSRB
We now validate our attack on a different dataset, using an
oracle trained locally to recognize traffic signs on the GTSRB
dataset. The attack achieves higher transferability rates at
lower distortions compared to the MNIST oracle.
Oracle Description: The GTSRB dataset is an image
collection consisting of 43 traffic signs [13]. Images vary in
size and are RGB-encoded. To simplify, we resize images
to 32x32 pixels, recenter them by subtracting the mean
component, and rescale them by factoring their standard
deviations out. We keep 35, 000 images for our training set
and 4, 000 for our validation set (out of the 39, 209 available),
and 10, 000 for our test set (out of 12, 630). We train the
oracle on our machine, using the DNN B from Table 13 (cf.
appendix), for 50 epochs with a learning rate of 10−2 and a
momentum of 0.9 (both decayed by 0.5 every 10 epochs).
Substitute DNN Training: The adversary uses two initial
substitute training sets extracted from the GTSRB test set.
The first includes the first 1, 000 samples and the second the
first 500. The number of initial samples is higher than for
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Figure 7: Success Rate and Transferability of Adver-
sarial Samples crafted on the GTRSRB dataset: each
bar corresponds to a different input variation.
MNIST substitutes as inputs have a higher dimensionality.
We train three substitute architectures C, D, and E (cf.
Table 13) using the oracle for 6 substitute training epochs
with a Jacobian-based dataset augmentation parameter of
λ = 0.1. Substitute C and E where trained with the 1, 000
sample initial substitute training set and achieve a 71.42%
accuracy. Substitute D was trained with the initial set of
500 samples. Its accuracy of 60.12% is lower than C and E.
Adversarial Crafting: We use Goodfellow’s algorithm
with ε between 0.01 and 0.5 to craft adversarial samples
from the test set. Results are shown in Figure 7. Adversarial
samples crafted with variations ε < 0.3 are more transferable
than those crafted with the same ε for MNIST models. This
is likely due to the higher input dimensionality—3, 072 com-
ponents instead of 784—which means almost 4 times more
perturbation is applied with the same ε. Nevertheless, with
success rates higher than 98.98% and transferability rates
ranging from 64.24% to 69.03% for ε = 0.3, which is hard to
distinguish for humans, the attack is successful. The transfer-
ability of adversarial samples crafted using substitute DNN
D is comparable or higher than corresponding samples for
DNNs C and E, despite being less accurate (trained with less
samples). This emphasizes that there is no strong correlation
between substitute accuracy and transferability.
6. ATTACK ALGORITHM CALIBRATION
Having shown in Section 5 that an adversary can force an
MNIST oracle from MetaMind, and a GTSRB oracle trained
locally, to misclassify inputs, we now perform a parameter
space exploration of both attack steps–the substitute DNN
training and the adversarial sample crafting. We explore the
following questions: “(1) How can substitute training be fine-
tuned to improve adversarial sample transferability?” and
(2) “For each adversarial sample crafting strategies, which
parameters optimize transferability?”. We found that:
• In Section 6.1, we show that the choice of substitute DNN
architecture (number of layers, size, activation function,
type) has a limited impact on adversarial sample trans-
ferability. Increasing the number of epochs, after the
substitute DNN has reached an asymptotic accuracy,
does not improve adversarial sample transferability.
• At comparable input perturbation magnitude, the Good-
fellow and Papernot algorithms have similar transfer-
ability rates (see Section 6.2).
DNN Accuracy Accuracy Transferability
ID (ρ = 2) (ρ = 6) (ρ = 6)
A 30.50% 82.81% 75.74%
F 68.67% 79.19% 64.28%
G 72.88% 78.31% 61.17%
H 56.70% 74.67% 63.44%
I 57.68% 71.25% 43.48%
J 64.39% 68.99% 47.03%
K 58.53% 70.75% 54.45%
L 67.73% 75.43% 65.95%
M 62.64% 76.04 62.00%
Table 1: Substitute Accuracy at ρ = 2 and ρ = 6 substi-
tute epochs and Transferability of Adversarial Samples:
for ε = 0.4 after ρ = 6 substitute epochs.
In this section, we use an oracle trained locally to limit
querying of the MetaMind API. We train architecture A (cf.
Table 13) for 50 epochs with a learning parameter 10−2 and
a momentum 0.9 (both decayed by 0.5 every 10 epochs).
6.1 Calibrating Substitute DNN Training
We first seek to quantify the impact of substitute training
algorithm parameters on adversarial sample transferability
and introduce a refinement to reduce oracle querying.
Choosing an Architecture: We train substitute DNNs A
and F to M (cf. Table 13) using 150 samples from the MNIST
test set as the substitute training set. During each of the 6
substitute training epochs, the DNN is trained for 5 epochs
from scratch. Between epochs, synthetic data is added to
the training set using Jacobian-based dataset augmentations
with step λ = 0.1. The substitute architectures differ from
the oracle’s by the type, number, and size of layers. In
Table 1, we report the accuracy of each architecture after 2
and 6 substitute training epochs, as well as the adversarial
sample transferability after 6 epochs. Adversarial samples
are crafted using the Goodfellow algorithm with an input
variation of ε = 0.4 (which we justify later). The last column
of Table 1 shows that the choice of architecture has a limited
impact on adversarial sample transferability, and therefore on
the attack success. The most important transferability drop
follows from removing all convolutional layers. Changing the
hidden layer activation function from rectified linear to a
sigmoid does not impact transferability significantly.
Choosing the number of substitute epochs: Another
tunable parameter is the number of epochs for which substi-
tute DNNs are trained. Intuitively, one would hypothesize
that the longer we train the substitute, the more samples la-
beled using the oracle are included in the substitute training
set, thus the higher the transferability of adversarial samples
will be. This intuition is confirmed only partially by our
experiments on substitute DNN A. We find that for for input
variations ε ≤ 0.3, the transferability is slightly improved by
a rate between +3% to +9%, but for variations ε ≥ 0.4, the
transferability is slightly degraded by less than 1%.
Setting the step size: We trained substitute A using dif-
ferent Jacobian-based dataset augmentation step sizes λ. In-
creasing or decreasing the step size (from λ = 0.1 used in the
rest of this paper) does not modify the substitute accuracy
by more than 3%. Larger step sizes decrease convergence sta-
bility while smaller values yield slower convergence. However,
increasing step size λ negatively impacts adversarial sample
transferability : for instance with a step size of 0.3 compared
to 0.1, the transferability rate for ε = 0.25 is 10.82% instead
of 22.35% and for ε = 0.5, 82.07% instead of 85.22%.
However, having the step size periodically alternating be-
tween positive and negative values improves the quality of
the oracle approximation made by the substitute. This could
be explained by the fact that after a few substitute epochs,
synthetic inputs are outside of the input domain and are
thus clipped to produce an acceptable input. We introduce
an iteration period τ after which the step size is multiplied
by −1. Thus, the step size λ is now replaced by:
λρ = λ · (−1)b
ρ
τ c (7)
where τ is set to be the number of epochs after which the
Jacobian-based dataset augmentation does not lead any sub-
stantial improvement in the substitute. A grid search can
also be performed to find an optimal value for the period τ .
We also experimented with a decreasing grid step amplitude
λ, but did not find that it yielded substantial improvements.
Reducing Oracle Querying: We apply reservoir sam-
pling [16] to reduce the number of queries made to the oracle.
This is useful when learning substitutes in realistic environ-
ments, or when interacting with paid APIs, where the number
of label queries an adversary can make without exceeding a
quota or being detected by a defender is limited. Reservoir
sampling is a technique that randomly select κ samples from
a list of samples. The total number of samples in the list
can be both very large and unknown. We use it to select κ
new inputs before a Jacobian-based dataset augmentation.
This prevents the exponential growth of queries made to
the oracle at each augmentation. At iterations ρ > σ (the
first σ iterations are performed normally), when consider-
ing the previous set Sρ−1 of substitute training inputs, we
select κ inputs from Sρ−1 to be augmented in Sρ. Using
reservoir sampling ensures that each input in Sρ−1 has an
equal probability 1|Sρ−1| to be augmented in Sρ. The number
of queries made to the oracle is reduced from n · 2ρ for the
vanilla Jacobian-based augmentation to n · 2σ + κ · (ρ− σ)
with reservoir sampling. In Section 7, we show that using
reservoir sampling to reduce the number of synthetic training
inputs does not significantly degrade the substitute accuracy.
6.2 Adversarial Sample Crafting
We compare the transferability of adversarial samples pro-
duced by each algorithm introduced previously [4, 9], to elect
the strongest technique under our threat model.
Goodfellow’s algorithm: Recall from Equation 5 the per-
turbation computed in the Goodfellow attack. Its only param-
eter is the variation ε added in the direction of the gradient
sign. We use the same architecture set as before to quantify
the impact of ε on adversarial sample transferability. In Fig-
ure 8, architecture A outperforms all others: it is a copy of
the oracle’s and acts as a baseline. Other architectures have
asymptotic transferability rates ranging between 72.24% and
80.21%, confirming that the substitute architecture choice
has a limited impact on transferability. Increasing the value
of ε above 0.4 yields little improvement in transferability
and should be avoided to guarantee indistinguishability of
adversarial samples to humans.
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Figure 8: Impact of input variation ε in the Good-
fellow crafting algorithm on the transferability of
adversarial samples: for architectures from Table 1.
Papernot’s algorithm: This algorithm is fine-tuned by
two parameters: the maximum distortion Υ and the input
variation ε. The maximum distortion5 defines the number of
input components that are altered in perturbation δ~x. The in-
put variation, similarly to the Goodfellow algorithm, controls
the amount of change induced to altered input components.
We first evaluate the impact of the maximum distortion Υ
on adversarial sample transferability. For now, components
selected to be perturbed are increased by ε = 1. Intu-
itively, increasing the maximum distortion makes adversarial
samples more transferable. Higher distortions increase the
misclassification confidence of the substitute DNN, and also
increases the likelihood of the oracle misclassifying the same
sample. These results are reported in Figure 9. Increasing
distortion Υ from 7.14% to 28.57% improves transferability:
at a 7.14% distortion, the average transferability across all
architectures is 14.70% whereas at a 28.57% distortion, the
average transferability is at 55.53%.
We now quantify the impact of the variation ε introduced
to each input component selected in δ~x. We find that reducing
the input variation from 1 to 0.7 significantly degrades ad-
versarial sample transferability, approximatively by a factor
of 2 (cf. Figure 10). This is explained by the fixed distortion
parameter Υ, which prevents the crafting algorithm from
increasing the number of components altered to compensate
for the reduced effectiveness yielded by the smaller ε.
Comparing Crafting Algorithms: To compare the two
crafting strategies and their differing perturbation styles
fairly, we compare their success rate given a fixed L1 norm
of the introduced perturbation δ~x, which can be defined as:
‖δ~x‖1 = ε · ‖δ~x‖0 (8)
where ‖δ~x‖0 is the number of input components selected in
the perturbation δ~x, and ε the input variation introduced to
each component perturbed. For the Goodfellow algorithm,
we always have ‖δ~x‖0 = 1, whereas for the Papernot al-
gorithm, values vary for both ε and ‖δ~x‖0. For instance,
‖δ~x‖1 = 0.4 corresponds to a Goodfellow algorithm with
ε = 0.4 and a Papernot algorithm with ε = 1 and Υ = 40%.
Corresponding transferability rates can be found in Table 1
and Figure 9 for our running set of architectures. Perfor-
mances are comparable with some DNNs performing better
5In [9], the algorithm stopped perturbing when the input
reached the target class. Here, we force the algorithm to
continue perturbing until it changed Υ input components.
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Figure 9: Impact of the maximum distortion Υ in
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ferability of adversarial samples: increasing Υ yields
higher transferability rates across DNNs.
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Figure 10: Impact of the input variation ε in the Pa-
pernot algorithm on the success rate and adversarial
sample transferability computed for ε ∈ {0.5, 0.7, 1} on
DNNs from Table 1 with distortion Υ = 39.80%.
with one algorithm and others with the other. Thus, the
choice of algorithm depends on acceptable perturbations:
e.g., all features perturbed a little vs. few features perturbed
a lot. Indeed, the Goodfellow algorithm gives more control
on ε while the Papernot algorithm gives more control on Υ.
7. GENERALIZATION OF THE ATTACK
So far, all substitutes and oracles considered were learned
with DNNs. However, no part of the attack limits its ap-
plicability to other ML techniques. For instance, we show
that the attack generalizes to non-differentiable target ora-
cles like decision trees. As pointed out by Equation 4, the
only limitation is placed on the substitute: it must model
a differentiable function—to allow for synthetic data to be
generated with its Jacobian matrix. We show below that:
• Substitutes can also be learned with logistic regression.
• The attack generalizes to additional ML models by:
(1) learning substitutes of 4 classifier types (logistic
regression, SVM, decision tree, nearest neighbors) in
addition to DNNs, and (2) targeting remote models
hosted by Amazon Web Services and Google Cloud
Prediction with success rates of 96.19% and 88.94%
after 800 queries to train the substitute.
7.1 Generalizing Substitute Learning
We here show that our approach generalizes to ML mod-
els that are not DNNs. Indeed, we learn substitutes for 4
representative types of ML classifiers in addition to DNNs:
logistic regression (LR), support vector machines (SVM), de-
cision trees (DT), and nearest neighbor (kNN). All of these
classifiers are trained on MNIST, with no feature engineering
(i.e. directly on raw pixel values) as done in Section 5.
Whereas we previously trained all of our substitutes using
DNNs only, we now use both DNNs and LR as substitute
models. The Jacobian-based dataset augmentation described
in the context of DNNs is easily adapted to logistic regression:
the later is analog to the softmax layer frequently used
by the former when outputting probability vectors. We
use 100 samples from the MNIST test set as the initial
substitute training set and use the two refinements introduced
in Section 6: a periodic step size and reservoir sampling.
Figure 11(a) and 11(b) plot for each iteration ρ the share
of samples on which the substitute DNNs and LRs agree with
predictions made by the oracle they are approximating. This
proportion is estimated by comparing labels assigned to the
test set by the substitutes and oracles before each iteration ρ
of the Jacobian-based dataset augmentation. All substitutes
are able to approximate the corresponding oracle at rates
higher between 77% and 83% after ρ = 10 iterations (to the
exception of the decision tree oracle, which could be due to
its non-continuity). LR substitute accuracies are generally
lower than those of DNN substitutes, except when targeting
the LR and SVM oracles where LR substitutes outperform
DNN ones. However, LR substitutes are computationally
more efficient and reach their asymptotic match rate faster,
after ρ = 3 iterations, corresponding to 800 oracle queries.
Table 2 quantifies the impact of refinements introduced in
Section 6 on results reported in Figure 11(a) and 11(b). The
periodic step size (PSS) increases the oracle approximation
accuracy of substitutes. After ρ = 9 epochs, a substitute
DNN trained with PSS matches 89.28% of the DNN oracle
labels, whereas the vanilla substitute DNN matches only
78.01%. Similarly, the LR substitute with PSS matches
84.01% of the LR oracle labels while the vanilla substitute
matched 72.00%. Using reservoir sampling (RS) reduces
oracle querying. For instance, 10 iterations with RS (σ = 3
and κ = 400) make 100 · 23 + 400(10− 3) = 3, 600 queries to
the oracle instead of 102, 400 without RS. This decreases the
substitute accuracy, but when combined with PSS it remains
superior to the vanilla substitutes. For instance, the vanilla
substitute matched 7, 801 of the DNN oracle labels, the PSS
one 8, 928, and the PSS with RS one 8, 290. Simarly, the
vanilla LR substitute matched 71.56% of the SVM oracle
labels, the PSS one 82.19%, and the PSS with RS 79.20%.
7.2 Attacks against Amazon &Google oracles
Amazon oracle: To train a classifier on Amazon Machine
Learning,6, we uploaded a CSV version of the MNIST dataset
to a S3 bucket. We then loaded the data, selected the multi-
class model type, and keept default configuration settings.
The process took a few minutes and produced a classifier
achieving a 92.17% test set accuracy. We cannot improve the
accuracy due to the automated nature of training. We then
activate real-time predictions to query the model for labels
from our machine with the provided API. Although prob-
abilities are returned, we discard them and retain only the
most likely label—as stated in our threat model (Section 3).
Google oracle: The procedure to train a classifier on
Google’s Cloud Prediction API7 is similar to Amazon’s. We
6https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning
7
https://cloud.google.com/prediction/
(a) DNN substitutes
(b) LR substitutes
Figure 11: Label predictions matched between the sub-
stitutes (DNN and LR) and their target oracles on test data.
Substitute DNN LR SVM DT kNN
DNN 78.01 82.17 79.68 62.75 81.83
DNN+PSS 89.28 89.16 83.79 61.10 85.67
DNN+PSS+RS 82.90 83.33 77.22 48.62 82.46
LR 64.93 72.00 71.56 38.44 70.74
LR+PSS 69.20 84.01 82.19 34.14 71.02
LR+PSS+RS 67.85 78.94 79.20 41.93 70.92
Table 2: Impact of our refinements, Periodic Step Size
(PSS) and Reservoir Sampling (RS), on the percentage of
label predictions matched between the substitutes and their
target classifiers on test data after ρ = 9 substitute iterations.
Amazon Google
Epochs Queries DNN LR DNN LR
ρ = 3 800 87.44 96.19 84.50 88.94
ρ = 6 6,400 96.78 96.43 97.17 92.05
ρ = 6∗ 2,000 95.68 95.83 91.57 97.72
Table 3: Misclassification rates (%) of the Amazon
and Google oracles on adversarial samples produced with
DNN and LR substitutes after ρ = 3, 6 epochs. The 2nd
column is the number of queries during substitute training.
Last row uses a periodic step size and reservoir sampling.
.
upload the CSV file with the MNIST training data to Google
Cloud Storage. We then train a model using the Prediction
API. The only property we can specify is the expected multi-
class nature of our model. We then evaluate the resulting
model on the MNIST test set. The API reports an accuracy
of 92% on this test set for the model trained.
Substitute Training: By augmenting an initial training
set of 100 test set samples, we train a DNN and LR substitute
for each of the two oracles. We measure success as the rate of
adversarial samples misclassified by the corresponding oracle,
among the 10, 000 produced from the test set using the fast
gradient sign method with parameter ε = 0.3. These rates,
computed after ρ ∈ {3, 6} dataset augmentation iterations,
are reported in Table 3. Results reported in the last row use
both a periodic step size and reservoir sampling (hence the
reduced number of queries made to train the substitute).
Experimental Results: With a 96.19% misclassification
rate for a perturbation ε = 0.3 crafted using a LR substitute
trained with 800 oracle queries, the model hosted by Amazon
is easily misled. The model trained by Google is somewhat
more robust to adversarial samples, but is still vulnerable to
a large proportion of samples: 88.94% of adversarial samples
produced in the same conditions are misclassified. A careful
read of the documentation indicated that the model trained
by Amazon is a multinomial logistic regression.8 As pointed
out in [4], shallow models like logistic regression are unable
to cope with adversarial samples and learn robust classifiers.
This explains why the attack is very successful and the LR
substitute performs better than the DNN substitute. We
were however not able to find the ML technique Google uses.
The last row of Table 3 shows how combining periodic step
sizes with reservoir sampling allow us to reduce querying
of both oracles during substitute training, while crafting
adversarial samples with higher transferability to the target
classifier. Indeed, querying is reduced by a factor larger
than 3 from 6, 400 to 2, 000 queries, while misclassification
decreases only from 96.78% to 95.68% for the Amazon DNN
substitute. It is still larger than the rate of 87.44% achieved
after 800 queries by the substitute learned without the refine-
ments. Similarly, the misclassification rate of the Google LR
substitute is 97.72%—compared to 92.05% with the original
method after ρ = 6 epochs, confirming the result.
8. DEFENSE STRATEGIES
The two types of defense strategies are: (1) reactive where
one seeks to detect adversarial examples, and (2) proactive
where one makes the model itself more robust. Our attack is
not more easily detectable than a classic adversarial example
attack. Indeed, oracle queries may be distributed among a
set of colluding users, and as such remain hard to detect. The
defender may increase the attacker’s cost by training models
with higher input dimensionality or modeling complexity,
as our experimental results indicate that these two factors
increase the number of queries required to train substitutes.
In the following, we thus only analyze our attack in the face
of defenses that seek to make the (oracle) model robust.
Many potential defense mechanisms fall into a category we
call gradient masking. These techniques construct a model
that does not have useful gradients, e.g., by using a nearest
neighbor classifier instead of a DNN. Such methods make
8
docs.aws.amazon.com/machine-learning
Training ε Attack ε O→O S → S S → O
0.15 0.3 10.12% 94.91% 38.54%
0.15 0.4 43.29% 99.75% 71.25%
0.3 0.3 0.91% 93.55% 1.31%
0.3 0.4 29.56% 99.48% 10.30%
Table 4: Evaluation of adversarial training: the columns
indicate the input variation parameter used to inject adversar-
ial examples during training and to compute the attacks, the
attack success rate when examples crafted on the (O)racle are
deployed against the (O)racle, the attack success rate when
examples crafted on the (S)ubstitute are deployed against
the (S)ubstitute, and the attack success rate when examples
crafted on the (S)ubstitute are deployed against the (O)racle.
.
it difficult to construct an adversarial example directly, due
to the absence of a gradient, but are often still vulnerable
to the adversarial examples that affect a smooth version of
the same model. Previously, it has been shown that nearest
neighbor was vulnerable to attacks based on transferring
adversarial examples from smoothed nearest neighbors[4].
We show a more general flaw in the category of gradient
masking. Even if the defender attempts to prevent attacks by
not publishing the directions in which the model is sensitive,
these directions can be discovered by other means, in which
case the same attack can still succeed. We show that the
black-box attack based on transfer from a substitute model
overcomes gradient masking defenses. No fully effective
defense mechanism is known, but we study the two with the
greatest empirical success so far: adversarial training [4, 14],
and defensive distillation for DNNs [10].
Adversarial training: It was shown that injecting adver-
sarial examples throughout training increases the robustness
of significantly descriptive models, such as DNNs [4, 14, 17].
We implemented an approximation of this defense using the
Google Prediction API. Since the API does not support the
generation of adversarial examples at every step of training,
as a correct implementation of adversarial training would
do, we instead inject a large amount of adversarial examples
infrequently. After training in this way, the model has a
misclassification rate of 8.75% on the unperturbed test set,
but the adversarial misclassification rate rises to 100% when
ρ = 6. To evaluate this defense strategy using a correct
implementation, we resort to training the oracle locally, us-
ing our own codebase that includes support for generating
adversarial examples at each step. After each training batch,
we compute and train on adversarial examples generated
with the fast gradient sign method before starting training
on the next batch of the original training data. Results are
given in Table 4. We observe that for ε = 0.15, the defense
can be evaded using the black-box attack with adversarial
examples crafted on the substitute and misclassified by the
oracle at rates up to 71.25%. However, for ε = 0.3, the
black-box attack is not effective anymore. Therefore, making
a machine learning model robust to small and infinitesimal
perturbations of its inputs is an example of gradient mask-
ing and can be evaded using our substitute-based black-box
approach. However, making the model robust to larger and
finite perturbations prevents the black-box attack. To con-
firm this hypothesis, we now show that defensive distillation,
which makes the model robust to infinitesimal perturbations,
can be evaded by the black-box approach.
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Figure 12: Evaluation of defensive distillation: Per-
centage of adversarial examples crafted using the Goodfellow
algorithm at varying ε misclassified by the oracle. T is the
temperature of distillation [10]. Curves marked by (direct)
indicate baseline attacks computed on the oracle, all other
curves where computed using a substitute, as described in
Section 4. Despite distillation preventing the attack on the
oracle directly, using a substitute allows us to evade it.
Defensive distillation: Due to space constraints, we refer
readers to [10] for a detailed presentation of defensive distil-
lation, which is an alternative defense. Because the remotely
hosted APIs we study here do not implement defensive distil-
lation or provide primitives that could be used to implement
it, we are forced to evaluate this defense on a locally trained
oracle. Therefore, we train a distilled model as described
in [10] to act as our MNIST oracle.
We train several variants of the DNN architecture A at
different distillation temperatures T = 5, 10, 100. For each
of them, we measure the success of the fast gradient sign
attack (i.e., the Goodfellow et al. algorithm) directly per-
formed on the distilled oracle—as a baseline corresponding
to a white-box attack—and using a substitute DNN trained
with synthetic data as described throughout the present pa-
per. The results are reported in Figure 12 for different values
of the input variation parameter ε on the horizontal axis.
We find that defensive distillation defends against the fast
gradient sign method when the attack is performed directly
on the distilled model, i.e. in white-box settings. However, in
black-box settings using the attack introduced in the present
paper, the fast gradient sign method is found to be successful
regardless of the distillation temperature used by the ora-
cle. We hypothesize that this is due to the way distillation
defends against the attack: it reduces the gradients in local
neighborhoods of training points. However, our substitute
model is not distilled, and as such possesses the gradients
required for the fast gradient sign method to be successful
when computing adversarial examples.
Defenses which make models robust in a small neighbor-
hood of the training manifold perform gradient masking : they
smooth the decision surface and reduce gradients used by ad-
versarial crafting in small neighborhoods. However, using a
substitute and our black-box approach evades these defenses,
as the substitute model is not trained to be robust to the
said small perturbations. We conclude that defending against
finite perturbations is a more promising avenue for future
work than defending against infinitesimal perturbations.
9. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced an attack, based on a novel substitute
training algorithm using synthetic data generation, to craft
adversarial examples misclassified by black-box DNNs. Our
work is a significant step towards relaxing strong assump-
tions about adversarial capabilities made by previous attacks.
We assumed only that the adversary is capable of observing
labels assigned by the model to inputs of its choice. We vali-
dated our attack design by targeting a remote DNN served
by MetaMind, forcing it to misclassify 84.24% of our adver-
sarial samples. We also conducted an extensive calibration
of our algorithm and generalized it to other ML models by
instantiating it against classifiers hosted by Amazon and
Google, with success rates of 96.19% and 88.94%. Our attack
evades a category of defenses, which we call gradient mask-
ing, previously proposed to increase resilience to adversarial
examples. Finally, we provided an intuition for adversarial
sample transferability across DNNs in Appendix B.
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A. DNN architectures
Figure 13 provides the specific DNN architectures used
throughout Sections 5, 6, and 11. The first column is the
identifier used in the paper to refer to the architecture. The
second and third columns respectively indicate the input and
output dimensionality of the model. Finally, each additional
column corresponds to a layer of the neural network.
ID In Out CM CM RL RL RL S
A 784 10 32 64 200 200 - 10
B 3072 43 64 128 256 256 - 43
C 3072 43 32 64 200 200 - 43
D 3072 43 32 64 200 200 - 43
E 3072 43 64 64 200 200 100 43
F 784 10 32 64 200 - - 10
G 784 10 32 64 - - - 10
H 784 10 32 - 200 200 - 10
I 784 10 - - 200 200 200 10
J 784 10 - - 1000 200 - 10
K 784 10 - - 1000 500 200 10
L 784 10 32 - 1000 200 - 10
M 784 10 32 - - 200s 200s 10
Figure 13: DNN architectures: ID: reference used in the
paper, In: input dimension, Out: output dimension, CM:
convolutional layer with 2x2 kernels followed by max-pooling
with kernel 2x2, RL: rectified linear layer except for 200s
where sigmoid units are used, S: softmax layer.
B. Intuition behind Transferability
Previous work started explaining why adversarial samples
transfer between different architectures [4, 14]. Here, we
build an intuition behind transferability based on statistical
hypothesis testing [8] and an analysis of DNN cost gradient
sign matrices. A formal treatment is left as future work.
Recall the perturbation in the Goodfellow algorithm. In-
specting Equation 5, it is clear that, given a sample ~x, the
noise added would be the same for two DNNs F and G
if sgn(∇~xcost(F, ~x, y)) and sgn(∇~xcost(G,~x, y)) were equal.
These matrices have entries in {+1,−1}. Let us write the
space of these matrices as Sgnn×m. Assume that the samples
~x are generated from a population distribution D (e.g., in
our case the distribution from which the images of digits are
drawn). The formula sgn(∇~xcost(F, ~x, y)) and D induce a
distribution DF over Sgnn×m (i.e. randomly draw a sample
from the distribution D and compute the quantity). Simi-
larly, DNN G and distribution D induce a distribution DG
over Sgnn×m. Our main conjecture is:
For two “similar” architectures F and G distribu-
tions DF and DG induced by a population distri-
bution D are highly correlated.
If distributions DF and DG were independent, then the noise
they add during adversarial sample crafting are independent.
In this case, our intuition is that adversarial samples would
not transfer (in the two cases you are adding noise that are
independent). The question is: how to verify our conjecture
despite the population distribution D being unknown?
We turn to statistical hypothesis testing. We can empiri-
cally estimate the distributions DF and DG based on known
samples. First, we generate two sequences of sign matrices
σ1 = 〈M1,M2, · · · 〉 and σ2 = 〈N1, N2, · · · 〉 using the sample
set (e.g. MNIST) for a substitute DNN F and oracle G.
Next we pose the following null hypothesis:
HN : The sequences σ1 and σ2 are drawn from
independent distributions.
We use standard tests from the statistical hypothesis testing
literature to test the hypothesis HN . If the hypothesis HN is
rejected, then we know that the sign matrices corresponding
to the two architectures F and G are correlated.
We describe the test we use. There are several algorithms
for hypothesis testing: we picked a simple one based on a
chi-square test. An investigation of other hypothesis-testing
techniques is left as future work. Let pi,j and qi,j be the fre-
quency of +1 in the (i, j)-th entry of matrices in sequences σ1
and σ2, respectively. Let ri,j be the frequency of the (i, j)-th
entry being +1 in both sequences σ1 and σ2 simultaneo-
suly.9 Note that if the distributions were independent then
ri,j = pi,jqi,j . However, if the distributions are correlated,
then we expect ri,j 6= pi,jqi,j . Consider quantity:
χ2? =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(ri,jN − pi,jqi,jN)2
pi,jqi,jN
where N is the number of samples. In the χ-square test,
we compute the probability that P (χ2 > χ2?), where χ2
has degrees of freedom (m− 1)(n− 1) = 27× 27 = 729 for
the MNIST data. The χ2? scores for substitute DNNs from
Table 1 range between 61, 403 for DNN A and 88, 813 for
DNN G. Corresponding P-values are below 10−5 for all archi-
tectures, with confidence p < 0.01. Thus, for all substitute
DNNs, the hypothesis HN is largely rejected: sequences σ1
ans σ2, and therefore sign matrices corresponding to pairs of
a substitute DNN and the oracle, are highly correlated. As
a baseline comparison, we generate 2 random sign matrices
and compute the corresponding χ2∗ score: 596. We find a
P-Value of 0.99 with a confidence of 0.01, meaning that these
matrices were indeed drawn from independent distribution.
However, we must now complete our analysis to character-
ize the correlation suggested by the hypothesis testing. In
Figure 14, we plot the frequency matrix R = [ri,j ] for several
pairs of matrices. The first is a pair of random matrices
of {+1,−1}. The other matrices correspond to substitute
DNN A and the oracle at different substitute training epochs
ρ. Frequencies are computed using the 10, 000 samples of
the MNIST test set. Although all frequencies in the ran-
dom pairs are very close to 1/2, frequencies corresponding
9We assume that the frequencies are normalized so they can
be interprested as probabilities, and also assume that all
frequencies are > 0 to avoid division by zero, which can be
achieved by rescaling.
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Figure 14: Frequencies of cost gradient sign matrix
components equal between substitute A and the or-
acle at substitute training epochs ρ ∈ {0, 3, 6} (three on the
right), compared to a pair of random sign matrices (first
image).
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Figure 15: Frequencies of cost gradient sign matrix
components equal between substitute A and the or-
acle
to pixels located in the center of the image are higher in the
(substitute, oracle) matrix pairs. The phenomenon amplifies
as training progresses through the substitute epochs. We
then compute the frequencies separately for each sample
source class in Figure 15. Sign matrices agree on pixels rele-
vant for classification in each class. We plotted similar figures
for other substitute DNNs. They are not included due to
space constraints. They show that substitutes yielding lower
transferability also have less components of their cost gradi-
ent sign matrix frequently equal to the oracle’s. This suggests
that correlations between the respective sign matrices of the
substitute DNN and of the oracle—for input components that
are relevant to classification in each respective class—could
explain cross-model adversarial sample transferability.
C. Discussion of Related Work
Evasion attacks against classifiers were discussed previously.
Here, we cover below black-box attacks in more details.
Xu et al. applied a genetic algorithm to evade malware
detection [18]. Unlike ours, it accesses probabilities assigned
by the classifier to compute genetic variants fitness. These
can be concealed by defenders. The attack is also not very
efficient: 500 evading variants are found in 6 days. As the
classifier is queried heavily, the authors conclude that the
attack cannot be used against remote targets. Finally, given
the attack’s high cost on low-dimensional random forests and
SVMs, it is unlikely the approach would scale to DNNs.
Srndic et al. explored the strategy of training a substi-
tute model to find evading inputs [12]. They do so using
labeled data, which is expensive to collect, especially for
models like DNNs. In fact, their attack is evaluated only
on random forests and an SVM. Furthermore, they exploit
a semantic gap between the specific classifiers studied and
PDF renderers, which prevents their attack from being ap-
plicable to models that do not create such a semantic gap.
Finally, they assume knowledge of hand-engineered high-level
features whereas we perform attacks on raw inputs.
Tramer et al. considered an adversarial goal different from
ours: the one of extracting the exact value of each model
parameter. Using partial knowledge of models and equation
solving, they demonstrated how an adversary may recover pa-
rameters from classifiers hosted by BigML and Amazon [15].
However, it would be difficult to scale up the approach to
DNNs in practice. To recover the 2, 225 parameters of a
shallow neural network (one hidden layer with 20 neurons)
trained on a local machine, they make 108, 200 label queries.
Instead, we make 2, 000 label queries to train substitute
DNNs made up of 8 hidden layers (each with hundreds of
neurons) with a total of over 100, 000 parameters—albeit at
the expense of a reduced guaranteed accuracy for the model
extraction operation. Unlike theirs, our work also shows
that our substitutes enable the adversary to craft adversarial
examples that are likely to mislead the remote classifier.
